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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS
THE COLLISION:
On June 30, 2011,
a 2005

at

approximately 5 p.m., Dana McCandless “Dana” was driving

Dodge truck eastbound 0n Highway 12 near mile post 69

weather was clear and the road was dry and

was a passenger and was seated
seatbelts

straight.

in

Idaho County. The

Mabel Robin Blackeagle “Robin”

in the front passenger seat. 1

Both occupants wore

and Mr. McCandless was traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour

in a 55-

m.p.h. zone. 2

At the same time, Brent Weddle was traveling westbound 0n Highway 12 and
stopped and/or was turning his father’s 1989 Toyota Pickup in the west bound lane near
milepost 69 t0

make

a

left

turn onto Swarthout Road.

Max Pease was

also driving

westbound 0n Highway 12 and was positioned immediately behind Mr. Weddle's
Pease failed t0 stop and crashed into the rear 0f Weddle's truck causing
the eastbound lane 0f travel

and

it

t0

launch into

collide With the appellants’ vehicle.3

McCandless took evasive action while being struck by Weddle and drove
0f the roadway coming t0 rest after nearly rolling the

and injured

his head,

vehicle.

off the side

Dodge Pick-up. He was unconscious

neck and arm area and was bleeding from

his head.4

His chief

complaint was his eye and elbow. His wife, Robin, struck the inside 0f the Dodge. Both

were wearing

1

2

seatbelts.

Both were injured.

Dana and Robin are now husband and wife. The vehicle was registered to Robin
The plaintiffs’ nephew was in the rear seat and is not a party to this lawsuit.

3 Tr. pp. 206-207

4 Tr. p. 203

Blackeagle.

LIABILITY:

Max Pease claims that Mr. Weddle passed him and then almost immediately came
t0 a stop such that Pease

had

striking Weddle's vehicle.

t0

slam 0n

his

brakes but was unable t0 prevent from

Based upon written statements, conversation With Weddle and

basic logic, Pease's attempt at deﬂecting liability

was without

merit.

In Pease's written statement t0 the Idaho State Police in response t0 the question 0f

What happened, he stated, "Suddenly I realized the truck in front wasn 't moving [sic]. I
tried t0 miss by steering right & breaking." I also noted that he did not realize the
problem until "just before impact". In response t0 the question 0f what he could have
done t0 avoid the crash, he wrote, "Be more alert!" The written statement was completed
0n July 14, 2011, two weeks after the crash, s0 he would not have been under any stresses
and could have accurately asserted that it was not his fault and that Weddle had slammed
0n his brakes. Moreover, in his written statement Pease asserts that he was 25-30 yards
behind the car in front 0f him [Weddle] and that he was traveling between 40-50 mph. If
Weddle had passed him and then hit his brakes, Pease would not have been "following"
him and, thus, would state that he was 25-30 yards behind Weddle. [Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4].
and questioned

Pease's statement, introduced at trial
traveling too closely

and was

in cross-exam, proves

inattentive. Pease's reaction time

he was

may have been somewhat

impaired over the average person as he admits that he was taking methadone the morning
0f the incident.
tailgating

Add in the time and

and inattentiveness

all

distance

it

and

takes t0 stop

but guaranteed a

it is

clear that Pease's

collision.

Mr. Weddle's Witness statement disputes any notion 0f him slamming 0n
brakes and conﬁrms that Pease caused the crash. Weddle
signaled t0 turn

left,

there

was

complete stop, then looked in

swerve around

me and

hit

(cars

coming

similar language

conﬁrmed

s0 I

had

t0

come t0 a
[sic]

t0

my passenger rear end which caused my truck to enter the
hit

my front end.

was deposition testimonv and

which he attempted

his negligence

oncoming lane

was driving home,

my rearview mirror and the Chevy pickup tryed

oncoming lane where the blue dodge 4X4
at trial, via examination,

in the

states, "I

his

Additionallv,

and introduced

interrogatories 0f Pease re-stating

t0 recant 7.5 vears later. Thus, three sources

which was believed

t0

be conclusive as t0

100%

negligence.

”

All parties agreed that the only driver 0f the vehicles that

that 0f McCandless.

The

issue

0n comparative negligence was between Weddle and Pease

and Whether Weddle had passed

t0 quickly in front 0f Pease.

compare the negligence 0f these two
negligence t0

was non-negligent was

WeddleS and 75%

vehicles

t0 Pease.6

and the two

(Weddle

The jury was asked

drivers.

settled

t0

The jury assigned 25%

with appellants just prior t0

trial.)

Appellants presented their case t0 a twelve-member jury in Nez Pearce C0unty.7

The defendant,

Pease, cross-examined the Witnesses 0f appellants but only asked two

questions, not related t0 the accident 0r damages, in his case-in-chief.
issues

None

were contested by the defendant/respondent by Virtue 0f Witnesses or

special verdict

form awarded damages

as contained

damage

exhibits.

The

0n said form.8 Both Weddle and Pease

were reimbursed by their insurance coverage for vehicle
settlements.9 Appellants d0 not believe they

0f the

loss

were treated

and damage along with injury

fairly

based upon the evidence

presented.

DAMAGES:
The

special verdict10 rendered

could not have

made

by the jury does not follow the evidence. The jury

the monetary awards without speculating, using quotient verdicts 0r

merely guessing. The evidence

is

not in the record for the jury t0

make such unusual

monetary awards.

5

Weddle

settled with appellants before the

commencement

of trial.

6 R. p. 162

7 The case was ﬁled in Nez Pearce by the original attorney for appellants and was not removed.
8 R. 162-164.
9 Both

Weddle and

vehicle titled in his

10 R. pp. 162-164.

Charles Weddle, testiﬁed wherein the father indicated the settlement for the
(1989 Toyota) and 0f injury settlement for his son.

his father,

name

Interestingly, the court granted a

damages. For the reasons stated in

new

trial subject t0

this brief, the

an additur 0n general

good judge could not have made the

reasoning on special damages based upon sound exercise of discretion. The evidence does
not support the conclusions reached by the court nor the dicta contained in his ruling upon
the motion for a

N0

new

trial.

conﬂicting evidence was introduced by the defendant/respondent.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Over seven years transpired from the date 0f the accident

t0 the trial actually

occurring. Various continuances and procedural issues caused the lengthy delay.

Subsequent

t0 the jury trial, appellants requested a

the court granted conditioned

new

trial,

pursuant

t0 court rule,

which

upon the respondent accepting an additur. Appellants never

requested an additur from the court. Respondent accepted the meager additur proposed

by the

court.

The additur only addressed general damages. Appellants appealed

t0 this

court pursuant to I.A.R., Rules 11 and 17.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard
numerous

cases

by

for review 0f a trial court’s ruling

this court. In

trial is set forth in

Smallwood v. Dick, 114 Idaho 860, 761 P.2d 1212

(1988),

Supreme Court must conclude

that (1)

the court set forth the basic standard Which

the damages

0n a new

is

“the

awarded by the jury were inadequate,

(2) the issue

0f liability was close, and

(3)

other circumstances indicated that the verdict was probably the result 0f prejudice,

sympathy 0r compromise, 0r

that, for

some other reason, the

liability issue

was not

actually

determined by the jury.”
Liability

was not a

factor in the case at bar as t0 the appellants.

The issues were

comparative negligence between the two defendants and the amount 0f damages. The
plaintiffs/appellants

were not subj ect

This brief’s focus
drivers, the inadequate

is

t0

comparative negligence.

0n the comparison 0f negligence between the two defendant

damages and other circumstances along with

issues related t0

expert witnesses and insurance.

Multiple cases further deﬁne the standard 0f appellate review. The basic role 0f the
appellate court

is

is

stated as follows: “Role

limited t0 determining Whether there

court.” Litchﬁeld

v.

0n appeal

is

not t0 “re-weigh” the evidence, but

was a manifest abuse 0f discretion by the

Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 835 P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992). See also, Bott

Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282 (1992); Sheridan
Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

trial

135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001); Carlson

v.

v.

v.

Saint Luke’s

Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 200

P.3d 1191 (2008).

The reviewing
where

it

court’s collective conscience can be “shocked in granting a

new

was almost completely conﬁrmed by other witnesses including the (IME)

trial

for the

defense and Where he was not impeached and the surrounding circumstances supported

him, for the jury and later the
10st

trial

wages was error.” Dinneen

v.

judge t0 disregard testimony 0n any point, including

Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1975).

ARGUMENT
1.

The Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure, Rule 59 outline the information for the
request for a new trial and the necessarv factual assertions for the court t0 applv
to the law.

I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1)(A)(C)
Liability.

N0

defense was presented by the defendant/respondent 0n any of

the evidence presented by the plaintiffs/appellants. Cross-examination occurred by
the defendant’s counsel 0f the plaintiffs’ witnesses.

The defendant, Max

Pease, took

the stand in defense and answered two questions unrelated t0 any issues before the
jury.11

N0

other Witnesses testiﬁed in the defendant’s case-in-chief. His defense

was that he was h0nest.12 “Admission 0f character evidence
defendant was improper and warranted a new

Idaho 529, 768 P.2d 792

N0

(Ct.

trial

.

.

.”

as t0 truthfulness 0f a

See, Pierson

v.

Brooks, 115

App. 1989).

experts of the defendant were presented to contest any of the special

damages Which included property damage, health care expenses,
any out-of-pocket expenses. General damages 0f pain and

lost

income; and

suffering, loss 0f

enjoyment 0f life and those matters covered as general damages by court instruction
13 had minimal,

if

any, testimony 0n cross-examination.

in respondent’s case-in-chief.

11 Tr. pp. 240:21-25; 241:1-19.

12 Tr. p. 286:10-13.

The only evidence before

N0

evidence was presented

the jury

was the report of

IME

the

0f the defendants which

was introduced

t0 the jury

by stipulation and

introduced by the appellant/plaintiff.

Brent Weddle was found by the jury to be
evidence was presented except cross-examination.
in direct

had

to

by defendant,

Max Pease. Max Pease,

25%
N0

negligent wherein n0
actual defense

plaintiff/respondent

was tendered

was

elderly

and

be helped/lifted into the witness chair. This factor can only explain the bias

0f the jury for the elderly man. Brent

Weddle was made Whole by the defendant,

Max Pease. How could he be considered negligent?13
The testimony 0f Pease
showed he claimed

in his cross examination in the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief

responsibility

0n three separate occasions.

First, his

statement t0

the police, Exhibit 4 0f the plaintiff entered into evidence, shows he states that he

should be “ Be

More Alert”. His

deposition testimony stated: “15-20 seconds

behind Weddle.” This deposition testimony was used t0 obtain the

At

trial

trial

Pease conﬁrmed he had 15-20 seconds t0 avoid any collision.14 The jury was

given 15 seconds 0f “quiet” time t0 evaluate the availability 0f Pease t0
to avoid

testimony.

make

a stop

Weddle.15 This statement was put before the jury from page 15 0f his

deposition wherein he

was questioned.

His discovery answer to Interrogatory 13

shows he stated Weddle was “100 yards
to the jury.

statements

Yet

at trial 7.5 years later

when such

in front.” This statement

he tried to explain away

statements were in preparation for

13 Tr. p. 201:12-21.

14 Tr. pp. 45-46.
15 Tr. p. 46:1-5.

10

trial.

was

all

also presented

0f these

Appellants’

Memorandum is

set forth

The jury had

t0

0n

this issue t0 the c0urt.16

be acting with passion or prejudice. This conclusion

is

borne

out by the unusual monetary awards discussed hereafter. The Brent Weddle

testimony at pp. 64-69 0f the transcript completely supports the written statements,
deposition testimony

and interrogatories given by Pease. Comparative negligence

should have been a non-issue. The compared negligence could not be accurate

although jury members have great latitude in weighing evidence.

Property Value. The closing arguments 0f counsel were not considered
evidence and the court so instructed in jury instruction n0.

1.

Defense counsel’s

statements were not accurate nor based upon evidence before the jury.

The

appellant presented zero evidence 0n value of property.

Defendant/respondent’s counsel stated:

“The argument by the
except by common sense.”17

plaintiff is their testimony is unrebutted.

Unrebutted

“There is n0 way in the world that this vehicle has that value. And even the ..
even the add-ons lose their value, they depreciate by time. I’m suggesting t0 you
that you all have it within your own ability, your own common sense t0 come up
With a value 0n that.
I’ll give you a broad range. I suggest t0 you that it’s somewhere in the
neighborhood 0f twenty t0 thirty thousand dollars, that’ What that vehicle’s worth.
I suggest t0 you that is the appropriate range t0 100k at When you are analyzing the
appropriate range t0 100k at When you are analyzing damages.”18
suggested a range and I’m telling you that’
What the evidence shows in this case. It’s not split the baby, not at all; it’s what the

“The same With the pick—up.

I

evidence shows. (Emphasis supplied). 19

16 Tr. pp. 198-199.

17 Tr. p. 299:20-22.
18 Tr. p. 300:5-16.
19 Tr. p. 301:17-21.

11

The respondent,
his

argument

via counsel,

t0 the jury

knew

that no rebuttal evidence existed

was not based upon evidence. N0 evidence

and that

existed t0 rebut

any testimony 0f Dana McCandless and the 19 comparables 0f truck value.20
(See rebuttal

argument that n0 expert was produced by the respondents.21)

The jury verdict
which were

totally

is

impossible because the jury used monetary numbers

devoid in the evidence presented; and, was totally unrebutted by

the defendant in any manner.

The jury awarded $15,500.00

for property

damage.

This court should remember that over seven (7) years had transpired since the
accident

when value

0f vehicle

was being presented

t0 the jury seven years later.

Appellant asked for damages as 0f the date 0f the collision.22

Income Damages. Also, 0n income damages, defense counsel argued that the
$5,000.00 rooﬁng income offered t0

Mr. McCandless was not

in the deposition testimony attached as Exhibit

disclosed. It

is

clearly

A t0 the declaration 0f counsel in

support 0f the motion for new trial.23 The objection, which was improper, had an
actual bias

upon the jury because the jury ignored

this evidence.

not explainable but was inﬂuential t0 the jury because this dollar

Medical Costs/General Damages. In regards
costs, the

jury also committed error. The court did

subject t0 a

20
21
22
23
24

new

trial

based upon jury error.24

Tr. p. 224:2-6
Tr. pp. 309:21-25; 310:1-8.
Tr. pp. 225-226.

R. p. 197.
R. p. 236

12

t0

The

objection

sum was

was

ignored.

medical and health care

ﬁnd

that general

damages were

Defense counsel argued t0 the jury:

“Take a multiple 0f two 0f that continuing treatment, and that equals your
for a total 0f $12,355 for medicals and pain and suffering.”25
general damages.
“D0 the same thing With respect t0 Ms. Blackeagle. .That’s $15,366 for meds
and pain and suffering.”26
.

.

.

.

Clearly, the jury did not even reach this

sum

in general

damages and had

t0

be inﬂuenced by outside considerations. The jury did not even award what was
suggested by defendant/respondent!

I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1)(F)

The unrebutted testimony 0f the
Truck was $35,000.00

The

plaintiff was

property damage t0 Dodge 250

as 0f the date 0f the collision. (7.5 years later trial

was

held).

extra add-ons t0 the motor vehicle were testiﬁed t0 being $11,000.00 t0

$14,000.00.

The lowest possible ﬁgure

the jury could consider

was $46,000.00. No

other testimony existed in the trial exhibits, the trial testimony and only argument 0f

respondent in closing. The jury awarded $15,500.00. This

from a

totally speculative source as

n0 other evidence

the evidence and even from the arguments, t0

is

come

t0

sum would have

existed. It

any other

is

t0

come

impossible, from

result. $15,500.00

blatant error by the jury.

However,

in his decision the court speciﬁcally stated the jury

$15,500.00 for the vehicle 0f appellants.27

25 Tr. pp. 300: 24-25; 301:1-4.
26 Tr. p. 301:5-8.
27 R. p. 221 at top 0f page.

13

The question 0n the

awarded

special verdict

was

property damage. The “normal” lay interpretation 0f property would include a

motor

vehicle.

The judge, by way 0f dicta,

decision (R. p. 222) that the
close t0 the

indicated in footnote 3, page 3 0f his

amount paid by the

plaintiffs’

insurance company was

ﬁgure reached by the jury. The court does not take into account that the

GEICO payment was taken into account before opting t0 have a jury set the value
0f the vehicle; and, they (appellants)

determined at

from

trial.

knew that the

The court reduced the

GEICO contrary t0 Dyet v. McKinley,
In any event, there

is

n0

logical

total

sum sought would be

verdict 0n vehicle

sum by funds

received

139 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236 (2003).

way to reach

$15,500

when

the lowest ﬁgure

based upon evidence for the truck was $46,000.00; and the income from ﬁshing
$5,000.00;

and

for

rooﬁng income 0f $5,000.00. The jury had

t0 use

some form 0f

quotient verdict 0r guess.

As

stated earlier,

was well versed

McCandless had 19 comparables on the truck value and

in auto values.

No

person 0r any exhibit disputed

Actual expenses included medical/health care

mathematics 0f the actual

billings

was not

billings.

this testimony.28

Any

addition by

possible for the jury t0 reach this result.

A “clean” exhibit was introduced s0 as not t0 prejudice the jury 0n the mathematics
for both 0f the appellants. (See, Plaintiff Exhibits 15

Exhibits 17 and 18; n0 objection by defense counsel).

awarded

$4,900.00. His hospital

and

16;

Compare

Plaintiff

Dana McCandless was

and chiropractic care exceeded that sum. The

IME, prepared by the defendant’s

expert, introduced into evidence

28 Tr. pp. 223-226.

14

by

plaintiff

was

indicated the medical treatment

fair

and reasonable and more

likely

than not t0

a reasonable degree 0f medical certainty. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 13 and 14).

N0

evidence rebutted that presumption. Plus, there are no billings that match the

sum

awarded by the jury.

The medical expenses

for

Robin Blackeagle were awarded

at $10,200.00.

This ﬁgure does not match any 0f the medicaUhealth care billings placed before the

and

jury. (See, Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 16

18).

The jury numbers 0n medicaUhealth care

billings are impossible

from the

evidence and documents presented. Furthermore, the exactness 0f the numbers

shows the jury had

t0 conclude said

sums from a source other than the actual

billings. (Note: It is alleged, that the

in the jury

room but the record

jury did not have plaintiffs exhibits 15 and 16

indicates the

same were introduced. This

fact, if

substantiated excluded exhibits submitted t0 the jury.) These exhibits completed
additions in mathematical format for the jury; and, set forth

all

all

health care costs

claimed. Regardless, the actual medical billings were before the jury and had been

“cleaned” t0 remove any reference t0 insurance. As such, the result reached, Which

was not rebutted, could not be a

possibility.

Finally, the plaintiffs testiﬁed t0 lost

taking said ﬁsh t0 the local

rooﬁng job that was

summer

set at $25.00

markets. The second loss 0f wages was for a

per hour not t0 exceed 200 hours for a total 0f

$5,000.00.

The

this point.

The jury simply ignored

total lost

wages 0f $5,000.00 for ﬁshing and

wages were $10,000.00. There
this evidence.

15

is

n0 rebuttal evidence 0n

The respondent,
“ I
could

stated:

via his attorney, in closing

ﬁnd

a friend

Who

could d0

argument 0n the rooﬁng
it

for cheaper than that.”29

Also, defense counsel argued that the $5,000.00
disclosed. It

is

was improper, had an actual
evidence.

The

rooﬁng income was not

clearly in the deposition testimony attached as Exhibit

declaration 0f Dunn in support 0f the motion for

objection

bias

issue

new trial.30 The

A t0 the

objection,

upon the jury because the jury ignored

Which

this

was not explainable but was inﬂuential and prejudicial

the jury because this dollar

sum was

t0

ignored.

(I.R.C.P. Rule 59( a)(1)(G)

No

evidence exists in the record t0 justify property

That number has never been mentioned by anyone.

own numbers

N0
for

t0

come

damage

of $15,500.00.

A jury would have t0 use its

to such a result.

health care billings would allow the jury t0 reach

numbers 0f $4,900.00

McCandless and $10,200.00 for Blackeagle. Those numbers simply d0 not

in the record.

(Compare

A jury would have t0 use its own numbers t0 come to such a result.

plaintiff exhibits 15, 16, 17

N0 sum was
number. The

would have

exist

lost

and

18.)

ever mentioned for lost income.

The jury found n0 such

income was not rebutted 0r explained away by anyone.

t0 exclude these

numbers

t0

29 Tr. p. 297:23-24.
30 R. p. 197.
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come

t0 such a result.

A jury

Emotion 0r inﬂamed

jury

is

the only possible result.

There was no conﬂicting evidence introduced by the defendant/respondent.
General damages are discretionary. But

0n a new

trial.

The defendant was an

this defendant.

The court ruled

inadequate and ordered a new

this

elderly

ﬁnding, as stated earlier,

man that had t0 be

Only, emotion could explain the potential

assisted/lifted into the Witness chair.

sympathy for

appears the small sums were as

The judge made

the result 0f passion 0r prejudice. 31
in his ruling

it

trial subject t0

that general

damages were

additur to be accepted bv the

respondent; and the iudge ruled that the iurv had t0 be under undue inﬂuence 0r
passion and preiudice.

The court

shifted the

burden 0n the additur from the

the defendant/respondent. It

with the appellants.

(

See,

The court reduced
appellants by the

is

clear that the decision t0 accept

Howes
the

v.

Fultz, 115

Idaho 681, 769 P.2d 558 (1989).)32
the

sum paid by their personal insurance, GEICO. The judgment

”Defendant was not entitled

plaintiff received

an additur rested

amount 0f the Dodge Pick-up truck owned by

should not be reduced pursuant t0 Dyet
(2003).

appellant/plaintiffs t0

t0

v.

McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236

have the judgment reduced for payments

from her insurance company.” Dyet, supra.

The respondents repurchased

the truck and were counting 0n the trial t0 pay

31 R. p. 223 (page 4 0f court decision 0n new trial).
32 “A trial judge can grant an additur or remittitur only by offering a new trial as an alternative, and then
only if he determines that the disparity between his evaluation of damages and the jury’s award is sufﬁcient
to suggest that the jury’s evaluation of damages was the result of passion or prejudice.” (See also, IRCP,
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the value established according t0 the 19 comparables testiﬁed t0 by

Dana

McCandless.
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(d)(2): Other factors: eight (8) points

The court can consider other
59, I.R.C.P.

1.

by Rule

Those factors may include the following:

The

collision

Highway 12
the

2.

factors not in the motion as outlined

occurred 0n the reservation of the Nez Pearce

at

Nez Pearce

The

plaintiff,

tribe.

tribe.

MP 69 in Idaho County, Idaho is in the reservation land 0f
tribe.33

Robin Blackeagle

is

from the Nez Pearce native American

N0 Native-Americans were 0n the jury. Robin

0f any 0f her peers.

The

lost

income was from ﬁshing enterprise that she

performs. The jury might not have appreciated this

have no way t0 prove

if

did not have a jury

was any

there

bias

by the

fact.

The

appellants

fact non-native

Americans were 0n the jury. The Idaho34 and U.S. C0nstitution35
guarantee a jury 0f one’s peers.36
3.

The defendant was unable

t0 properly ambulate.

He was

lifted/assisted

into the witness chair.

The court and

all

observers could determine this

does not reﬂect this

The court had the

fact.

fact.

ability t0

The record
observe this fact

33 Tr. p. 73,
34 Article I §7.
35 Article 1 §7.
36 State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990). See also, Smallwood v. Dick, supra. ‘the standard for
granting a new trial under IRCP 59(a)(5) permits an adequate review of the decision 0f the trial court in
order t0 ensure the right to trial by jury guaranteed by this section.” Dee also, Tr. p. 81.
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and the demeanor 0f all
argument that

will

be

witnesses. This observation

set forth in this brief hereafter.

the defendant/respondent and his Wife

appropriate for

is

The

health 0f

was brieﬂy discussed

in

testimony in his examination.37
4.

Brent Weddle was made whole by the defendant.
considered negligent

5.

is

How Weddle could be

unusual. 38

Defense counsel used innuendo and insinuation that the plaintiffs were
only greedy people. Yet Charles Weddle, owner of the Toyota, testiﬁed

McCandless evasive action prevented a head 0n

collision

with the

T0yota.39
6.

McCandless testiﬁed he saw Weddle d0 nothing improper.

These factors are believed

t0

have inﬂamed or caused emotional decisions by

the jury not supported by fact.

The jury was inﬂuenced by some measure

other than factual or documentary evidence. (See, Transcript, pages 206209.)

7.

Dr. McCormick, the
for the defense.

this

IME

expert,

was

Her subpoena was

t0

appear 0n Thursday t0

cancelled. Plaintiffs’ counsel

may occur. For over one month prior to

pay her

fees t0 attend.

testify

trial, offers

knew

were made

t0

Counsel refused any contact 0f their “expert” t0

37 Tr. pp. 29, 33: 17-18, 41: 17-25, 60;7-10.
38 (See, Transcript at page 201:12-21.)
39 (See, Transcript at pages 199-200.)
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subpoena. Then at

subpoena

t0

trial,

the defense indicated the court could not allow a

an out-of-state expert. Yet the plaintiffs/appellants were

The

forced t0 be examined out-of- state by this expert.

plaintiffs

had n0

40 choice. The court ruled that the expert Witness did not have t0 be

made

available in his decision 0n the

new

trial.41

-Important questions could have been asked of this witness. The
plaintiffs

were denied due process. This matter was discussed

pretrial conference.

from the

plaintiffs.

at the

A motion in limine was propounded With a response
The same was never heard by the

court. See,

page 10

0f clerk’s record and response 0f plaintiffs 0n 12/11/2018. See also, page

201 0f clerk’s record 0n the
ability t0

26(4)(A)

subpoena the
is

silent

0n the

IME

memorandum 0f plaintiffs

being denied the

expert; ﬁrst full paragraph. I.R.C.P.

ability t0

subpoena expert Witnesses 0f the

defendant.

-The court stated in

his

memorandum

decision 0n request for

new trial

that the appellants were not denied due process. 42

-Appellants had tried for months to subpoena Dr.
avail.43

40 R. 237-238.
41 R. Id.

42 (See, clerk’s record, page 225.)
43 (See also, Transcript pages 151:20-25; 152-153.)
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McCormick t0 n0

The

appellants suggest that the

subpoena

all

remedy

is

a

new

trial

With the ability t0

witnesses desired subject t0 paying the reasonable costs for

experts.

8.

The

trial

general damages.

court found that the award t0 the appellants was inadequate 0n

The court granted an additur wherein the

appellants did not

request an additur. The court can grant an additur but the following case law

is

salient:

“A trial judge can
as

grant an additur 0r remittitur onlv bv offering a

an alternative (Emphasis Supplied), and then only

disparity between his evaluation 0f

Howes

request a

v.

Fultz, 115

new trial and

was the

The

by the jury was the

The

44 R.

sufﬁcient t0

Idaho 681, 769 P.2d 558 (1989). The appellants

the foregoing case indicates that right for the appellants.
t0 either accept 0r rej ect

appellants were never granted any option for

foregoing case indicates

is

result 0f passion 0r

Yet the court gave the determination to the respondents
the additur.

he determines that the

damages and the jury’s award

suggest that the jury’s evaluation 0f damages
prejudice.”

if

new trial

is

the standard.

The

trial

new

trial.

p. p. 236.
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trial

which the

court declared that the evaluation

result 0f passion 0r preiudice. 44

appellants desire a

new

The

2.

and the relationship

inabilitv t0 discuss insurance

in a iurv trial 0f

Idaho

Rule 0f Evidence, Rule 411 added t0 the prevention 0f a fair trial and does not
bear the truth t0 the iurv and is misleading and preiudicial as the same is a

m
The

case 0f Loza

v.

Arroyo Dairy, 137 Idaho 764, 53 P.3d 347 (Idaho App. 2002)

explains With accuracy the purpose

and application 0f Rule 411,

the case at bar, the inability t0 mention that the defendant

I.R.E.

However,

was insured was harmful

to the process 0f a fair trial because 0f his physical limitations.

He was

elderly

suffered from neuropathy which cause a daily use 0f methadone. His Wife
elderly

and

ill

t0

appear

at trial.45 In

in

was

and
t0

sum, the defendant was a “prop” for the

insurance company which undoubtedly evoked sympathy and bias from the jury.

The jury

instruction n0. 12

which prohibits the mention 0f insurance and

informs the jury not t0 consider the issue 0f any insurance causes an injustice since
it is

a “legal ﬁction”. 46

As attorneys we are supposed

be zealous representatives 0f our

we

clients.

By

t0 bring forth the “truth”

and

not mentioning insurance as attorneys,

are asked t0 present a fraud and not be completely honest.

Pease was not the real party in interest but rather State

The truth

is

that

Max

Farm Insurance.

Rule 411 has exceptions but read in conjunction with Rule 403 makes any use 0f
the “exceptions” t0 Rule 411 0n the mention 0f insurance non-admissible. This
factor

is

brought before

insurance company

is

this court t0 point

one-sided.

The

out that the practice 0f trial

plaintiff, in the case at bar, is

presenting the true facts t0 the jury. Rule 411

45 Tr. p. 60:7-10.
46 R. p. 180.
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is

adopted by

work with an

prevented from

this court for

practitioners. It appears fruitless t0 argue t0 this court the rule

The point being made

is

unusual circumstances that

inﬁrmed man,

The

new

may lead t0

The reason

purpose but does not allow for

actual bias

from a jury. An elderly

for presentation 0f this

argument

is

“other factors”

trial.

difﬁcult question t0 answer

this appellate court as a

them and

its

adopts.

Max Pease, was presented t0 the jury. Sympathy and bias were

likely increased.

justify a

that Rule 411 has

it

is

what can be done

cure for the problem.

differently 0r suggested t0

We must accept people as we ﬁnd

as they are allowed t0 testify. In preparation for trial, three different

sources of the defendant testimony were obtained 0n the issue 0f liability and

Max Pease recanted the

comparative negligence between the two defendant drivers.

years 0f preparation for the trial 0n the three sources concerning his testimony.47

His aging process was likely a problem. The jury awarded a

comparison

t0

25%

negligence

Brent Weddle. The court noted actual prejudice 0r bias in regards t0

general damages as mentioned previously.

N0 comment was made by the
defendant to recall or

testify.

court 0n the general health 0r ability 0f the

Rule 411 should be expanded

t0 allow the court to

give instructions 0n health issues related t0 such factors as age, medications,
limitations 0r other unusual circumstances

and

t0 allow the

mention 0f the real

party in interest, to-wit: insurance. The expansion 0f case law 0n this issue could
correct the perceived injustice that occurred in this

47 Tr.

p. 49.
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trial.

CONCLUSION
1.

The

relief

requested by the appellants

is

a

new trial on

all issues.

The

comparative negligence, property damage, the medicaUhealth care

income and general damages were
exhibits.

all

costs, lost

inconsistent With trial testimony

The court found 0n general damages

that the jury

and

was inﬂuenced by

passion 0r prejudice.
2.

The court should have granted the
a

3.

new

The

trial

appellants the ability t0 accept the additur 0r

and not the respondent.

appellants seek rulings 0n the inability to subpoena the defense

IME

expert

witness.

4.

The

appellants seek rulings 0n the status 0f the insurance non-disclosure rules

adopted by

this court.

Rule 411 should be expanded for unusual circumstances

that could be brought to the attention 0f the court with the

remedy of

mentioning insurance as the real party in interest.48

Dated

this 30th

day 0f July, 2019.

Robin D. Dunn
Robin D. Dunn
/s/

Attorney for Appellants

48 “The fundamental and

man creates government is t0 protect the rights of the
perform this duty it is to be thrown down.” Thomas Jefferson. The U.S.
Supreme Court has stated the reiterated numerous years ago the statement 0f sovereignty 0f the people. Yick
W0 v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
foundational reason

individual. If government fails to
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